Abstract. The original Mortensen-Pissarides model possesses two elements that are absent from the commonly used simplied version: the job destruction margin and training costs. I nd that these two elements enable a model driven by a single aggregate shock to simultaneously explain most movements involving unemployment, vacancies, job destruction, job creation, the job nding rate and wages.
and vacancies during the business cycle. Even under an alternative calibration proposed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008 [15] ) additional exogenous shocks 1 correlated with productivity shocks are required to t the data (see Lubik (2009, [21] )). This suggests that the simple model studied by Shimer lacks some propagation mechanism.
One shortcoming of this model is that it operates through the job creation margin only, assuming a constant rate of job destruction. The model does not allow rms facing worsened economic conditions to lay o more people. This is at odds with establishment level data studied by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, [8] ) and Davis et.
al. (1997, [9] ), who document sharp increases in the pace at which rms destroy jobs in recessions, while the response of job creation is mild.
There are several reasons why the job destruction margin has been largely ignored.
First, data on worker ows seem inconsistent with the view that the job destruction margin plays an important role. The rate at which workers separate from jobs is almost constant at business-cycle frequencies 2 . One shortcoming of this data is that it is dominated by worker ows that do not immediately aect employment: job-tojob transitions and worker replacement. More recent data from the BLS and JOLTS rearm 3 the view that much of the adjustment in a recession comes through the job destruction margin.
The second reason the literature discounts variations in job destruction is its counterfactual implications for the behavior of the vacancy rate. An increase in the number of workers searching for jobs following a spike in job loss makes it easier for rms to ll positions, thus, encouraging them to open more vacancies. This contradicts the negatively sloped Beveridge curve relationship between unemployment and vacancy rates observed in the data.
In this paper I solve this problem by introducing training costs in addition to recruiting costs. I build on the observation by Silva and Toledo (2009, [32] ) that more than 90 percent of costs associated with the job creation process are incurred 1 Exogenous shocks to matching eciency are an example of such shocks. 2 See Shimer (2005, [30] ). 3 See Davis et. al. (2006, [7] ).
after a worker has been hired. Introducing training costs attenuates the eect of reduced market tightness on the incentives of a rm to post vacancies, restoring the Beveridge curve relationship.
The third reason is computational. To explain why some rms choose to layo workers while others prefer to retain them, a model needs to exhibit match-specic heterogeneity and to keep track of the distribution of job productivities. This makes the computation and analysis of equilibrium behavior a challenging task and calls for convenient simplifying assumptions. In this paper, I propose such a simplifying assumption. I link the size of the support of the distribution of productivities to the number of jobs that can operate in the economy at any point in time. This assumption captures the idea that once the least productive jobs are destroyed, the jobs that survive are better on average. As a result, a persistent decline in aggregate conditions leads to an abrupt but short-lived response of job destruction.
I take advantage of this simplifying assumption to construct a tractable general equilibrium version of the MP model where match-specic heterogeneity leads to endogenous variations in the job destruction rate. I introduce training costs into the model and explore its t. I nd that the two new elements: endogenous job destruction and training costs -enable a model driven by a single aggregate shock of plausible magnitude to simultaneously explain most movements in unemployment, vacancies, job destruction, job creation, the job nding rate, prots and wages. Thus, I nd that the original MP model possesses a propagation mechanism that the simplied version does not.
To properly evaluate the t of the model I expand the set of variables the model seeks to explain. In addition to productivity, unemployment, vacancies and wages used in most of previous studies, I include job creation, job destruction and job nding rates into the analysis. To measure the t of the model and compare dierent specications, I use Bayesian techniques developed for analyzing DSGE models. I form relatively wide priors for parameters of interest and let the data choose parameter combinations that provide the most likely explanation. I then measure the fraction of variations in the data that the model can explain under the best parameter combination. Posterior densities of parameters of interest not only tell me which values of parameters are preferred by the data, but also shed light on how well they are identied and, hence, how important they are for the propagation mechanism.
I use this estimation strategy instead of the commonly used calibration strategies for three reasons. First, there is no consensus in the literature regarding many of the parameters of interest. A recent debate between Shimer (2005, [30] ) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008, [15] ) demonstrates how dierent calibrations of the model can lead to dierent results. Second, a likelihood function, by giving natural weights to all the moments of the data, provides a tighter measure of success compared to most previous studies. Finally, the Bayesian approach provides a simple tool for understanding which assumptions of the model are important to t the data and which are not.
Using this estimation strategy, I establish that the explanatory power of the model does not rely on an extreme calibration, like that of Hagedorn and Manovskii, who need relatively small job creation costs to generate large uctuations in unemployment and vacancies, and a tiny value of the bargaining power of the worker to explain the behavior of real wages. Instead, the model ts the data reasonably well for almost any values of these two parameters.
To better understand the mechanism, I analyze two new elements of the model separately and nd that both are crucial for model t. The rst element is that a rm and a worker can each choose to preserve or terminate their relationship based on match prots. This makes rms more eager to destroy jobs when aggregate conditions are worse and the value of a match is lower. The role of the job destruction margin in propagating aggregate shocks is to immediately create an additional pool of unemployed at the very beginning of a recession.
The second element is that job creation costs are a mix of recruiting and training costs. Recruiting costs are costs associated with opening and lling a vacancy, while training costs include all costs specic to the new match incurred conditional on nding a worker to ll the vacancy 4 . When more jobs are destroyed and the labor market becomes less tight, it is much easier for rms to nd workers. In absence of training costs this would lead to an increase in the number of vacancies. The introduction of training costs attenuates the eect of reduced market tightness on the total cost of creating a new job. Firms facing a lower value of a prospective match and a relatively small decrease in the cost of hiring choose to post fewer vacancies and create fewer new jobs. The dual structure of creation costs explains the decrease in vacancies and the slow response of job creation once jobs have been destroyed.
The contribution of this paper is to construct a tractable general-equilibrium model with match-specic heterogeneity, which not only explains the magnitudes of observed uctuations in labor market variables, but also generates impulse responses to aggregate shocks reective of the data. Using the simplicity of the model I derive an analytical relationship between the parameters of the model and the slope of the Beveridge curve. I show how the elasticity of the matching function, the ratio of training to recruiting costs and other parameters jointly determine the slope of the Beveridge curve. This derivation also illustrates why, in this model, the total size of job creation costs does not play a crucial role in determining the response of unemployment and vacancies to aggregate shocks.
My main nding is that a reasonably parameterized labor matching model augmented by a job destruction margin and training costs can simultaneously explain more than three-quarters of uctuations in unemployment, vacancies, job destruction and the job nding rate, all as a result of a single aggregate shock. The model is also consistent with empirical volatility and cyclicality of productivity, real wages and prots, and generates reasonably slow responses of job creation.
Because the model I construct is deliberately simple, it does not take into account several important aspects of the labor market emphasized in the literature. I abstract from on-the-job search and job-to-job transitions, which account for a large fraction of 4 The idea that creation costs can be a mix of vacancy-specic and match-specic costs was recently revived and discussed by Pissarides (2009, [27] ). Non-linear creation costs were also used by Yashiv (2006, [35] ) and Rotemberg (2006, [29] ).
worker ows 5 . The assumption about the nature of heterogeneity that simplies the solution of the model also makes employed workers reluctant to search for new jobs.
I abstract from the interaction between job destruction and capital adjustment as in den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000, [10] ). Introducing capital and incorporating vintage eects would signicantly complicate the analysis. The model also ignores the multi-worker nature of a rm, wage rigidities, collective bargaining and market power, variations in search eort, labor force participation and many other factors 6 .
Nonetheless, the model goes a long way toward explaining the response of the US labor market to aggregate shocks. As such it can serve as a useful starting point for further analysis of the eects of the margins mentioned above and for quantitative studies of labor market policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and derives the slope of the Beveridge curve. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology.
Section 4 provides a discussion of the results and section 5 concludes.
II. Model
Before describing the primitives of the model, I provide an explanation for some of the modeling choices I make. In the Mortensen-Pissarides framework, at every point in time, each job is characterized by an individual productivity level. Dierences in productivity lead to dierences in prots and wages across jobs. A large enough decrease in the productivity of a job leads to termination of the job at the mutual agreement of the worker and the rm. In this model, aggregate shocks have a non-trivial eect on the productivity distribution, which becomes a state variable. 5 See Pissarides (1994, [26] ) and Nagypal (2008, [25] [20] ) study decisions of rms with multiple workers, Gertler and Trigari (2006, [13] ) and Rotemberg (2006, [29] ) study eects of collective bargaining and market power, Veracierto (2008, [34] ) incorporates the labor force participation decision, and Meyer (1990, [22] )
measures the discouraging eects of unemployment insurance on search eort.
Variations in the number of jobs destroyed are a result of shifts in the productivity distribution over time.
Instead of carrying the productivity distribution, I choose to model the job destruction margin in a somewhat reduced form. I assume that in every period, the idiosyncratic component of productivity, represented in my model by a taste shock, is drawn independently from the same distribution with varying support. The size of the support is equal to the number of existing jobs. This makes the number of jobs a state variable, which characterizes the productivity distribution. I use variations in the support of the distribution to capture the idea that once the relatively unproductive jobs are destroyed, the remaining jobs are better on average. This assumption ensures that a persistent aggregate productivity shock does not lead to a persistent increase in the rate of job destruction.
The model I construct is a real business cycle model with a matching friction.
I deliberately simplify the model to concentrate the discussion around the two key elements: endogenous job destruction and training costs. First, I describe the physical environment. Then I explain how employment relationships between workers and rms are formed, operated and terminated. I close the model with a description of the household's problem and equilibrium conditions. I then explain how the incorporation of endogenous job destruction and training costs aects the propagation of shocks.
II.1. Physical Environment. Time is discrete and continues forever. The economy is populated by a unit measure of workers and a large number of rms. Workers can be unemployed searching for a job, headhunting or engaged in a productive employment relationship. I denote the measure of unemployed, U t , the measure of headhunters, X t , and N t represents the measure of workers engaged in productive activities. Their sum is equal to the total number of workers:
Each rm has a blueprint for producing a dierent variety of the consumption good and needs a worker to be productive. A rm can be in one of three states: matched with a worker and producing, searching for a worker or idle. A rm can hire at most one worker, who provides at most one unit of time. As operating rms always demand the maximum amount of time, N t represents both the measure of workers in productive activities and the measure of operating rms. I denote the measure of rms searching for a worker V t , which also represents the number of vacancies.
The measure of idle rms is suciently large so there are always enough potential entrants.
The production technology of a rm is linear in labor so that each worker produces A t units of the nal good. A t represents aggregate labor productivity and follows an autoregressive process of order one governed by exogenous productivity shocks ε t drawn from a standard normal distribution:
where A ss is the steady-state value of productivity, ρ is persistence, and σ is the standard deviation of shocks to labor productivity.
New employment relationships are formed through a matching process between rms with openings and unemployed workers. The mass V t of rms that decide to post vacancies are matched with the mass of unemployed workers U t according to a constant returns to scale matching function 7 :
where M t is the mass of new employment relationships starting to operate in the next period.
The cost of job creation has two components: a recruiting component includes costs of advertising and interviewing, and a training component includes costs of setting up a working environment and training a worker to meet specic needs. Thus, rms post vacancies at a cost c and then rms matched with workers incur an additional training cost K per match.
To cover these costs, rms hire headhunters in a specialized competitive labor market. The total mass of headhunters, X t , required to cover job creation costs in period t, satises 8 :
I assume that workers are members of a large family that pools income and then distributes it equally to all members. The representative household then maximizes the expected discounted utility of a representative worker, which values consumption and leisure:
Consumption aggregator C t is dened over dierent varieties of the nal good:
where z it denotes the idiosyncratic taste shock for variety of rm i, and N t is the measure of productive units operating in period t. I assume that the taste shock is drawn from a distribution with variable support:
where i indexes rms uniformly distributed on a closed interval [0, J t ] and J t is the measure of jobs available at the beginning of period t.
At the beginning of each period, after aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic tastes become known, rms and workers in existing productive relationships meet and decide whether to preserve the relationship or terminate it. I follow the literature in assuming that if they decide to keep it, they split the surplus using a Nash bargaining solution. I denote ψ the bargaining power of a worker. The threat point of the worker 8 Assuming that headhunters have the same productivity, A t , as production workers does not change any of the results. Head-hunters are introduced in order to separate them from production workers, to simplify the exposition and make the interpretation of job creation costs more transparent. In equilibrium headhunters represent a tiny fraction of the labor force.
is to become unemployed and the threat point of the rm is to become idle. Firms and workers discount the future at the same rate.
I denote ζ t the fraction of jobs that are terminated at mutual agreement of the worker and the rm. Workers join the unemployment pool and start searching for new jobs during the same period. The number of productive units that keep operating in period t is:
While N t units produce nal goods, idle rms open V t new positions and hire M t unemployed workers to ll them. These workers are trained in period t to become productive in period t + 1. I assume that the training cost, K, is split between the worker and the rm in the same proportion as their future surpluses.
The number of jobs carried to the next period is the sum of survivors, N t , and new matches, M t :
Having described the primitives, technologies and preferences, I now describe the competitive equilibrium in this economy.
II.2. Characterization of Equilibrium. First, I describe the household's problem.
The solution of this problem determines how the price of each variety of the nal good is resolved. Second, I describe how the outside option of a productive worker is determined. Third, I derive the continuation values of rms and workers, and describe how through bargaining they split the total surplus of the match. Fourth, I discuss the problem rm i and worker i face, when deciding whether to terminate their relationship. Finally, I describe how idle rms choose their recruiting activity.
I conclude by dening a competitive equilibrium.
The representative household chooses consumption q it of each variety i to maximize utility subject to (5) and a budget constraint:
where all of the wage and prot income net of training costs borne by the workers is spent on nal goods produced by rms in the same period. In equilibrium, markets for all varieties of the nal good clear:
Therefore, aggregate prots Π t are the sum of individual prots of rms net of headhunting costs:
Household optimization dictates that output of individual rms is priced using marginal utility of consumption with the price of each variety proportional to household taste for that variety:
where λ t is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
The wages of headhunters w t are set competitively such that members of the household are indierent between headhunting and being unemployed. Therefore, the wage w t compensates a headhunter for the disutility of work and for the option value of nding a job while being unemployed:
In equation above, the ratio of matches to unemployment,
, is the probability of nding a job, and Γ W t is the worker's expected future benet from engaging in an employment relationship (see below). The future benet is taken net of the training cost, which is split between the worker and the rm.
The total value of job i to the worker is the present discounted sum of wages, W it , net of her outside option, w t . When deciding whether to preserve the relationship with the rm, the worker compares this total benet to the alternative of walking away and getting nothing. Therefore, the value of job i to the worker, V W it , satises:
Because of the simplifying assumption that taste shocks are i.i.d., the values of future benets to the worker are independent of i:
Similarly, the present discounted sum of prots of rm i is compared to the alternative of walking away and getting nothing. The value of the job to rm i satises:
Likewise, the values of future benets to rms are all equal:
Every period the rm and the worker bargain over the wage, W it , which splits the current surplus in xed proportions:
From combining this equation with equations (12) and (13) above, it follows that future and total surpluses are split in the same proportions:
where joint future surplus Γ t is dened as follows:
Since taste shocks (6) are strictly decreasing in i by construction, and prices (10) are linear in tastes; prots, wages and match values are all strictly decreasing in i. Wage bargaining condition (14) and surplus split (15) 
This equation determines the number of surviving jobs, N t , the cuto price, p t = p Nt,t , and the ecient endogenous rate of job destruction, ζ t . Firms and workers terminate their relationships when the sum of current and future surpluses becomes negative.
Finally, free entry of new rms into the labor market guarantees that vacancies are open until their expected marginal costs are equal to their expected marginal benets:
where w t is the competitive wage paid to headhunters and 
A competitive equilibrium of the model economy is a solution to equations (1) To capture this idea, I use the following preference specication:
This specication borrows innite Frisch elasticity of labor supply from the model of indivisible labor and employment lotteries of Hansen (1985, [17] ) and Rogerson (1988, [28] ) 9 . The only dierence from the standard specication is that this utility function is not necessarily consistent with balanced growth In the absence of a widely accepted explanation for variations in the labor wedge 11 I use a reduced form specication (18) . Parameter γ determines the response of the outside option of a worker to variations in productivity and, thus, leads to variations in the labor wedge and in the value of a job. Through variations in values of jobs, this specication has concrete predictions for the behavior of prots that I later use as an independent check of consistency.
I now illustrate the eects of two parameters on the response of the value of a match to variations in productivity. I linearize equations (5), (10) and (15) and substitute them into each other to obtain the elasticity of the value of the match with respect to productivity:
9 See a full derivation for alternative values of labor supply elasticity in Appendix VI.3. Because the Frisch elasticity is not identied separately from other parameters of the model, I x it at its conventional value. 10 Note that a model with habit persistence would be equivalent to this specication, while consistent with a long-run balanced growth path. 11 In yet another approach Karabarbounis (2010, [19] ) explores a calibrated model of home production. Substitution between home goods and market goods over the business cycle generates variations in the observed labor wedge, while the true labor wedge remains constant.
wherex t denotes percentage deviations from steady-state 12 , ρ denotes persistence of the productivity shock, and 1 + δ = A negative productivity shock ε t leads to a persistent decrease in productivity A t and results in a decrease in expected future benets, Γ t . This shifts the cuto price upward and leads to a spike in job destruction and a consequent increase in
where U ss is the steady-state unemployment rate. The response of unemployment is determined by the same two parameters mentioned above, γ and δ, as well as by the average unemployment rate. (17) and substitute in the matching function
where α is the elasticity of the matching function, ϕ = When training costs are absent, ϕ → 0, the response of market tightness to changes in prospects of future prots is small. A negative productivity shock leads to a sharp increase in unemployment, which through a mild response in market tightness leads to an increase in the vacancy rate. Thus, when most of the costs are recruiting costs, a sharp increase in unemployment makes workers much easier to nd, encouraging rms to post more vacancies.
When, on the contrary, most of the costs are training costs, ϕ → 1, a decrease in the value of the match leads to a sharp decrease in market tightness. Training costs attenuate the response of total costs to market tightness, discouraging rms from opening vacancies in a recession.
Combining equation (21) with equations (19) and (20) I derive the slope of the Beveridge curve: To give a numerical illustration, I set tentative values for the key parameters.
One can infer the elasticity of the matching function directly from comparing the volatilities of market tightness and the job nding rate following Shimer (2005, [30] ).
I use this method to set α to 0.72. I build on evidence from Silva and Toledo (2009, [32] ) to infer the size of total costs and its split into recruiting and training costs.
Using this evidence, I set δ to 0.8, so that total job creation costs represent 40 percent of the quarterly wage of a typical employee, and ϕ to match the observation that training costs account for 93 percent of job creation costs incurred by rms. I also set ρ to 0.92 -the typical value for persistence of productivity shocks in the business cycle literature, and U ss to 5.6 percent -the historical average unemployment rate in the U.S.
First, when jobs are destroyed at an exogenously given rate, the Beveridge curve coincides with an isoquant of the matching function. Its slope is determined exclusively by the elasticity of the matching function, α:
Second, when rms are allowed to choose whether to destroy jobs based on future prots, and all job creation costs are recruiting costs, the Beveridge curve is positively
Increasing the fraction allocated to training costs solves this problem. When training costs are set to correspond to 93 percent of job creation costs, leaving 7 percent to recruiting costs, the predicted slope of the Beveridge curve comes close to the slope of -1 -the slope of U.S. unemployment and vacancy data. After a sharp employment adjustment in the rst period, the least productive jobs have already been destroyed and the job destruction rate quickly returns close to its original level. As productivity slowly recovers, the cuto price for job destruction slowly returns to its original level. As rms see an increase in future prots, they start opening more vacancies and creating more jobs.
III. Empirical Methodology
To explore the ability of the model to t the data I use recently developed Bayesian methods for analyzing DSGE models. 13 This methodology has several advantages when compared to commonly used calibration strategies. In the context of vigorous debates over parameters of the standard matching model, the Bayesian framework 13 A survey of these methods is provided for instance by An and Schorfheide (2007, [1] ). In this section, I describe the strategy that I use to evaluate the model. I also discuss data sources and prior distributions. First, I solve for the steady-state of the model. I then log-linearize the equations of the model around the steady-state and solve the resulting system of linear forward-looking equations using a method developed by Sims (2002, [33] ). This gives me the state-space representation of the model:
where X t is the vector of state variables and Y t is the vector of observables. I assume that the innovation to labor productivity, ε t , is the only exogenous shock in the . The unemployment series is the unemployment rate for those older than age 16, provided 14 To avoid stochastic singularity I need at least as many shocks as observed variables. If I include productivity shocks, I can exclude one of the measurement errors. I choose not to do so because that would imply a prior choice of the variable I want the model to explain exactly. I choose to remain agnostic about the choice of variables the model can best explain. 15 The algorithm is extensively discussed in Geweke (1999, [14] ). I use the open source DYNARE software developed by Collard and Juillard (2003, [6] ) and collaborators. 16 To avoid merging data series from dierent sources for job creation, job destruction, job nding Prior distributions are reported in Table 1 Table 2 . The matching elasticity is estimated to be 0.64, close to Shimer's estimate of 0.72. This is not surprising given that the parameter is identied in the same way through the relationship between the job nding rate and market tightness.
The posterior estimate of the bargaining power of workers, ψ, has a very wide condence interval: from 27 percent to 61 percent. This implies that the value of bargaining power has little or no eect on the dynamic properties of the model. This conrms the analytical expressions described in equations (19)- (22) The only point at which the data that are directly aected by the bargaining power of the workers is the volatility of real wages. Like labor productivity, the series for real wages has a large measurement error, driven mostly by changes in the consumption price index, while nominal wages remain largely unchanged over the cycle. The model prefers to attribute most of variations in the wage series to measurement error rather than placing signicant weight on its random movements.
The estimate for the total job creation cost, φ, incurred by a rm lies in a wide range from 14 to 48 percent of quarterly wages of a new hire. The fraction of training costs and other costs specic to a match in total creation costs, ϕ, is tightly estimated at 97 percent. As noted before, the second parameter is key to explaining the behavior of vacancies and the negatively sloped Beveridge curve. Both of these parameters match quite closely the evidence presented by Silva and Toledo (2009, [32] ). They estimate total costs to be between 36 and 55 percent of the quarterly wage of a new hire, with the fraction of training costs estimated at around 93 percent.
The result that bargaining power and the size of total job creation costs do not play a very important role in explaining the behavior of unemployment, vacancies and wages over the business cycle is in stark contrast with existing literature. One reason for this is the omission of the job destruction margin. When rms are not allowed to vary their ring activities, a much larger decline in the value of a match is required to explain the increase in unemployment through the job creation margin alone. When variations in match value are large, the bargaining power of a worker has to be unreasonably small to match low variability in wages. The other reason is the general equilibrium specication, which decouples the job creation cost parameter from variations in the value of the match, which are mainly driven by the curvature of preferences.
The estimate for the curvature of demand, γ, is at a surprisingly low value of 0.13 18 .
However, a closer look at the implications of this value for the behavior of the value of a match claries its meaning. Substituting γ = 0.13, ρ = 0.9 and δ = 1.6 implied by the posterior mode into equation (19) gives a value of the elasticity of match value to an aggregate shock of 1.17. In the standard labor search model, this corresponds to a replacement rate of 0.15 19 . This is in the ballpark of the value of 0.4 used by
Shimer and by studies of the eects of unemployment benets and rigid wages, and much lower than the value of 0.95 used by Hagedorn and Manovskii.
I do a simple check for consistency of this parameter using its implications for the behavior of prots. Figure 5 in the Appendix compares the series for prots as a fraction of GDP predicted by the model with that observed for the U.S. economy. The prediction of the model matches remarkably well both the volatility and cyclicality of the prot series, even though the data for prots was not used in the estimation of the model.
Finally, the posterior mode of the average job destruction rate is estimated between 4 and 5 percent. This value is somewhat higher than the prior and implies a job nding rate of 70 to 85 percent. This is contrary to the nding of Cole and Rogerson (1999, [5] ) that a relatively low job nding rate required to match data on job creation and job destruction implies counterfactually long duration of unemployment. Instead, the implied estimate of duration is at the lower bound of plausible duration values. 18 The value of a match needs to fall to discourage rms from creating jobs or to encourage them to destroy more jobs. For the value of a match to fall in response to a negative aggregate shock the labor wedge has to be procyclical, which implies a value of γ smaller than one. 19 If IV.2. Model Fit. To evaluate the t of the model, I compare the second moments of the data with moments of articial data generated by the model when hit by the estimated productivity shock. Table 3 The model matches well most of the cross correlations between observables with one exception. In the data job creation responds to aggregate shocks negatively at rst and then rebounds slowly to rehire workers. The model predicts an immediate although slow positive response of job creation. When compared to the model, the data on job creation has a lag of about one or two quarters. This is essentially the only dimension on which the model doesn't perform well. The gap between wages in the model and in the data is satisfactory given that the discrepancy between the two commonly used series for real wages is large 20 . The series for labor productivity also has a large measurement error component.
To study the importance of the two key assumptions for model performance, I
compare the performance of the benchmark model with ve alternative specications.
In the rst alternative specication, I set training costs to zero and re-estimate the model. In the second alternative specication, in addition to absence of training costs, I x the job destruction rate at its steady-state level. The third alternative specication is the model of Lubik (2009, [21] ), where jobs are destroyed exogenously at a constant rate, but non-linear job creation costs are allowed. In this specication I measure the joint explanatory power of shocks to productivity, preferences and 20 The two commonly used series for real wages are average hourly earnings in private nonfarm payrolls divided by the consumption price index and the labor share times labor productivity. The root mean square dierence between the two detrended series is 0.94 log points which is comparable to average wage variability over the cycle of 0.97 log points. . Lubik applies similar methods to the same data on GDP, unemployment, vacancies and wages. He allows for exogenous shocks to preferences and market power, which are somewhat similar to the preference specication I use. Thus, this specication provides a comparable account for the explanatory power of a model with constant exogenous job destruction, but variable creation costs.
In the fourth alternative specication, I apply the same estimation strategy to Results of model comparison are summarized in Table 4 . Numbers in the rows of The explanatory power added by these two elements is more than two times larger than that produced by the H-M calibration. However the benchmark specication does not rely on the two most controversial assumptions: an extremely low value for job creation costs and low bargaining power of the worker. Instead, it matches very 22 Direct introduction of training costs into Shimer's model under both calibrations does not alter its empirical performance and, therefore, is not reported.
well empirical values for both the total job creation costs and the split of these costs into the recruiting and training components. Another potential line of research concerns the interaction of matching frictions with market power as discussed by Rotemberg (2006, [29] ). Among the main unanswered questions are the sources of shocks driving the economy and the possibility of endogenous cycles in models with matching frictions.
where the consumption aggregator is dened as:
and the taste shocks are drawn from:
subject to the production technology:
the headhunting technology:
the job accumulation equation:
and the constraint on time use:
I dene Lagrange multipliers: p it on production function of good i, w t on the headhunting technology, Γ t on the job accumulation constraint, and µ t on time use, all multiplied by a common intertemporal Lagrange multiplier λ t . Then the following rst order conditions characterize the solution to the planner's problem. The value of product i satises:
the value of a job:
the optimal rate of productive employment:
the value of an unemployed:
the value of a headhunter:
and the optimal number of vacancies:
Substituting the value of an unemployed into the value of a headhunter leads to:
Most of the equations of the planner's solution already coincide with equations that characterize the competitive equilibrium. The only dierence comes from equations (25) and (26) . From comparing them to equations (17) and (11) it follows that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto-optimal if and only if the Hosios condition is satised:
For a Cobb-Douglas matching function used in the model this simplies to: 
The system of equations of the model can then be reduced to:
(1)
of the model, w t = 1 is the numeraire and ε t is the exogenous shock.
The structural parameters of the model are:
There is a one-to-one mapping between:
To compute the steady-state I follow the following steps:
I plug these values into a numerical solver to nd g that satises: where I introduce new notation: (1−ϕ 2 )α g t Substitute p t , c t from (7 ) and (8 ) into (11 ) and (12 ) : 
Guess solution:
n t = τ a t Then applying the expectations operator yields: E t a t+1 = ρa t Therefore, n t is a jump variable E t n t+1 = E t τ a t+1 = τ ρa t = ρn t Solve for τ : 
